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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Republican Party’s national platform of 1860 is useful for 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which was written just six years later by a Republican-
controlled Congress.1  That platform, however, has frequently been 
overlooked or misunderstood.2  In particular, the due process plank 
of the platform has often been portrayed as supporting the doctrine 
called “substantive due process.”3  A close look at the platform, 
though, shows that it did not actually support that doctrine, and 
instead refutes it. 
In Chicago during May of 1860, on the brink of the Civil War, 
the Republican Party held its second national convention,4 and the 
plank in question took the form of a resolution: 
That the normal condition of all the territory of the United 
States is that of freedom; That as our Republican fathers, 
when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, 
ordained that “[sic] no persons should be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law,” it becomes our 
duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, 
to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all 
attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of 
Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to 
give legal existence to slavery in any Territory of the United 
 
 1  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; National Republican Platform (May 17, 1860) in 
KIRK PORTER & DONALD JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1964, at 30–32 
(1966). 
 2  See Howard Jay Graham, Procedure to Substance—Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 
1830–1860, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 483, 493 (1952): “That historians—both general and 
constitutional—have almost completely ignored the party platform as a source for 
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment itself testifies to serious oversights and 
misconceptions.”  This remains true. 
 3  See, e.g., MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 
62–63 (2006); EDWARD CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING 
AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JUDICIAL CONCEPT 114 (1948); Louise Weinberg, 
Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 733, 762 (2007); 
Richard Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell 
Us About its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 300 (2006); Robert J. Reinstein, 
Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth 
Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 396  (1993).  
 4  NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS, 1831–2000, at 24 (Cong. Q. ed., 2001).  The 
party’s first national convention was in Philadelphia during June of 1856.  Id. at 49.  
There had been a mass meeting in February of 1856 at Pittsburgh, but this should 
not be considered a “convention,” because anyone could attend, not just delegates.  
See WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852–1856, at 254 
(1987).   
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States.5 
Throughout this Article, I will call this the due process “plank,” and 
will only use the term “Due Process Clause” with reference to the 
Constitution.  At first sight, this plank looks something like an 
assertion that slavery violated substantive due process, but that 
conclusion is incorrect and rests only upon faulty inference.6 
By its terms, this plank of the platform addressed liberty in free 
federal “territory,” rather than in areas like the District of Columbia 
where substantive due process would have applied equally.7  Even the 
most prominent and ardent abolitionists recognized that this plank 
offered no opposition to federal support of slavery in the District of 
Columbia.8  Congress largely stopped supporting slavery in 1862, but 
not because of any substantive penumbra of the Due Process Clause.9 
In his first inaugural address, Abraham Lincoln said that the 
Republican Party’s platform, which had been adopted at their 1860 
convention, was like “a law to themselves and to me.”10  Few sources 
were as widely publicized and broadly representative as this platform, 
which makes it a very good indicator of public meaning. 
Consider briefly the big picture.  In 1791, the Fifth Amendment 
was ratified, declaring that the nation would deprive no one of “life, 
 
 5  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (emphasis added).  This plank was 
the platform’s eighth resolution or “declaration.”  Id.  The first internal quote mark 
was misplaced, and belonged after the word “should” because the Fifth Amendment 
does not include that word.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Some versions of the 1860 
platform omit the internal quote marks altogether.  See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 
U.S. 244, 297 n.11 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (this footnote in Justice White’s 
concurring opinion recites the 1860 due process plank without any internal quote 
marks; it is the second footnote on page 297, and so is sometimes numbered “2” even 
though it is the eleventh footnote in White’s opinion).  See generally infra Kasson 
Papers, note 98 (draft platform is in Iowa archives). 
 6  See EMERSON DAVID FITE, THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1860, at 124 (1911).  
 7  See, e.g., 4 DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE 
MAELSTROM, 1829–1861, at 12 (2005) (“It had long been assumed . . . that various Bill 
of Rights provisions applied” in the District). 
 8  For example, Frederick Douglass protested the omission of the District from 
the 1860 platform.  See FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 410 
(Philip Foner & Yuval Taylor eds., 1999).  So did William Lloyd Garrison.  See 
Theodore Lockwood, Garrison and Lincoln the Abolitionist, 6 THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
QUARTERLY 199, 208 (1950). 
 9  Congress first banned slavery in the District.  See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 
12 Stat. 376.  Then Congress banned slavery in the territories.  See Act of July 1, 1862, 
ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432; ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 203 (2011).   
 10 Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861) in RICHARD GILDER AND 
DANIEL FISH, 6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 169–70 (1905).  Cf. Letter of 
Edward Bates to O.H. Browning, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1860, at 10 (belittling platforms). 
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liberty, or property, without due process of law.”11  In 1868, this same 
clause was applied to the states.12  Later, the United States Supreme 
Court used this clause to rule on substance that was not enumerated 
in the Constitution, such as English-only schools,13 abortion,14 
grandparent visitation,15 and sex.16  The Court has unanimously 
acknowledged that the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause 
“is suggested neither by its language nor by pre-constitutional 
history.”17  Yet they have forged ahead, believing, in the words of 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, that “we must never fail to ask ourselves 
not only what the law is, but what the law should be.”18  Defenders of 
substantive due process cherish it,19 but the doctrine remains highly 
disputed. 
The term “substantive due process” was not in use before the 
twentieth century, though the concept of substantive law has been 
analytically useful for centuries.20  An intriguing article by Professor 
 
 11  U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
 12  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 13  See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 398–99 (1923). 
 14  See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  For present purposes, it makes 
no difference whether the social results of these cases are wonderful or catastrophic. 
 15  See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 16  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Had those who drew and 
ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they 
might have been more specific.”).  See generally infra note 210 (incorporating 
enumerated rights against the states). 
 17  Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985) (citations 
omitted).  Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion but no justices dissented.  Id. at 
214.  
 18  Richard Reuben, Man in the Middle, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 35 (quoting 
Anthony Kennedy).  Cf.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177  (1803). 
 19  See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of 
Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 318–20 (2012) (lauding the courts as a 
barrier against the “representative body”).  But see id. at 345 (claiming that federal 
courts are themselves representative bodies). 
 20  See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 138 
(First Edition, 1765).  Blackstone distinguished substantive from procedural law: 
Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the law, but also 
the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be altered but by 
parliament; for, if once those outworks were demolished, there would 
be an inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itself. 
Id.  This excerpt is often misquoted.  See the errata after Blackstone’s Table of 
Contents.  Substantive and remedial law are also distinguishable.  See, e.g., City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“remedial, rather than substantive”).  Not 
only Blackstone, but also the antebellum United States Supreme Court, distinguished 
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Ryan Williams in 2010 suggested that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might affect substantive law even while the 
identical clause in the Fifth Amendment does not.21  Williams cited 
the 1860 due process plank as a reason for attributing substantive 
content to the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.22  
Putting aside what effect a Republican endorsement of substantive 
due process in 1860 would have had, such an endorsement did not 
happen. 
The 1860 plank deliberately omitted places like the District of 
Columbia where slavery was common, because Republicans such as 
Abraham Lincoln believed that federally enforced slavery was 
constitutional there, albeit deplorable.23  According to the 1860 
Census, there was a much larger number of slaves in the District than 
in the entire remainder of exclusive federal jurisdiction, including all 
of the federal territories combined (putting aside slaves held by 
Native American tribes).24  Republicans in 1860 were primarily 
attempting to stop the spread of slavery, as compared to uprooting 
that oppressive system where it already existed, and prior to the Civil 
War the Republican platform was one of containment rather than 
abolition.25 
The word “territory” in the platform was used by Republicans in 
its typical narrow sense, which excluded the individual states and 
other areas like federal forts and dockyards.  The “republican fathers” 
had abolished slavery in the territories that were then in existence, 
but had not abolished slavery within federal property throughout the 
south, where slavery remained legal up to the Civil War.26  Given the 
narrow use of the word “territory” in the due process plank, the 
common understanding was that it did not include the District of 
Columbia.27  Likewise, the phrase “give legal existence to slavery” in 
 
“modes of proceeding” from other law.  See infra text accompanying note 45.  Before 
the Civil War, the word “process” was often limited to procedural matters.  See infra 
note 53 (citing a legal dictionary). 
 21  Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L. J. 
408, 474 (2010). 
 22  Id.  Cf. Frederick Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process, 58 
EMORY L. J. 585, 590 (2009) (remarking that the “overwhelming” consensus is that 
the Fifth Amendment’s clause is not substantive). 
 23  See infra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
 24  See infra notes 85, 86, and accompanying text.  
 25  See PAUL RONAN, HEROES, VILLAINS & DUPES: HOW THE ANTEBELLUM PRESIDENTS 
ALLOWED SLAVERY TO DRIVE THE COUNTRY TO THE CIVIL WAR 163 (2010). 
 26  See FONER, supra note 9, at  203 (2011). 
 27  See, e.g., supra note 8 (views of abolitionists). 
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the plank was widely understood as being applicable only to areas 
(unlike the District) where slavery had not already attained legal 
existence.28 
There is no reason to doubt that the 1860 plank used the 
concept of “due process” in the traditional ancient manner of Magna 
Carta, in order to insist that government officials can only deprive 
people of liberty if the deprivation is authorized by law.29  Of course, 
an act of Congress unauthorized by the Constitution is not law, and 
therefore the U.S. Supreme Court  explained in 1856 that a key test 
of due process is to, “examine the [C]onstitution itself, to see 
whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions.”30  
Antebellum Republicans who disagreed about which constitutional 
provisions collectively barred territorial slavery nevertheless agreed 
that one of those provisions was the Due Process Clause, which 
thereby served as a kind of lowest common denominator.31 
If the 1860 platform had employed due process in a substantive 
way, then its logic would have applied to the District too, where 
thousands of slaves resided.  The fact that the due process plank did 
not refer to or affect the District thus confirms that substantive due 
process was not employed.  The due process plank relied implicitly 
upon other constitutional material to prevent slavery from spreading 
where it did not already exist, in the same way that the plank was 
inexplicit about the constitutional authority by which the 
“Republican fathers” had abolished territorial slavery decades 
earlier.32 
The 1860 due process plank mostly retained its form four years 
after the 1856 convention, which shows considerable devotion to the 
plank.33  This part of the 1860 platform is often mistakenly cited 
 
 28  See, e.g., infra note 127 and accompanying text (Lyman Trumbull discusses this 
distinction in Congress). 
 29  See Williams, supra note 21, at 434 (discussing interpretation of due process 
and Magna Carta in eighteenth century Britain). 
 30  Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 U.S. 
272, 277 (1856).  This case was decided on February 19, 1856.  See CHARLES WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 72 (1999).  The first national 
Republican convention occurred four months later.  See supra note 4.  
 31  I am grateful to Eric Foner for suggesting that this mathematical analogy 
could make the sentence clearer, via  private communication. 
 32  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV. § 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States. . . .”). 
 33  The 1860 plank is recited at text accompanying note 5 supra, and the 1856 
plank is recited at text accompanying note 65 infra.  
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nowadays as evidence that antebellum Republicans supported the 
doctrine of substantive due process, and for that reason alone the 
1860 platform is well worth considering in detail.  Properly 
understood, the plank is impossible to reconcile with that doctrine. 
To get a fuller sense of what the plank was about, it is necessary 
to consider the political and legal background just before the Civil 
War—that is the subject of Part II.  Part III discusses how the plank 
was written so as to avoid intra-party controversy, including 
controversy about whether various other clauses of the Constitution 
forbade slavery in the District of Columbia.  Part IV presents evidence 
that the plank refers only to areas where slavery lacked legal 
existence, rather than to areas like the District of Columbia where 
slavery already had legal existence.  Part V describes the various 
constitutional clauses that implicitly undergird the plank, other than 
substantive due process, which the plank neither recognized nor 
endorsed.  Part VI discusses abolitionists’ criticisms of the 1860 
platform, demonstrating that they were well aware that the District of 
Columbia was omitted.  Part VII addresses the use of hortatory rather 
than mandatory language in the platform, such as use of the word 
“should” instead of “shall.”  Part VIII presents some brief conclusions. 
II.  POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The due process plank was central to the 1860 Republican 
platform, Abraham Lincoln pledged to uphold it, and he urged 
fellow Republicans to stick to it.34  In those days, presidential 
candidates did not make speeches or actively campaign on their own 
behalf, and therefore party platforms mattered much more than they 
do now.35  When the southern states seceded, it was in large part a 
reaction to the Republican policy implemented by the 1860 due 
process plank.36  Much of the federal government’s non-military 
legislation in the 1860s was pursuant to provisions of the 1860 
platform,37 which again shows that the platform was a seriously 
impactful document, analogous in some ways to the Declaration of 
Independence which it quoted.  Four decades later, the 1860 
 
 34  See DAVID DONALD, LINCOLN 270 (1996). 
 35  See HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN PRESIDENT-ELECT 14–15, 26 (2008) (“Prevailing 
political tradition called for silence from presidential candidates . . . in an era when 
party platforms still very much mattered.”).  
 36  BRIAN FARMER, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 171 
(2005). 
 37  THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 179 
(Michael Kazin et al. eds., 2011). 
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platform was remembered this way: 
The Republican party upon this platform entered and 
fought its great battle for human liberty.  Because it waged a 
successful warfare it can hardly be said that the principles 
for which it fought were overthrown in the contest.  The 
Republican party said the Constitution went to the 
territories, and carried liberty with it.38 
The historical background of the due process plank is most 
easily understood by keeping in mind four separate events.  In 1856, 
the Supreme Court decided its first major case about due process in 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land.39  Later that year, the first Republican 
national convention was held in Philadelphia, resulting in a platform 
that included a due process plank. Then, in 1857, the Court decided 
a much more famous case involving due process: Dred Scott v. 
Sandford.40  Lastly, in 1860, the Republicans’ held their national 
convention in Chicago, where they modified the due process plank of 
four years earlier.  The order of these four events is important, and 
each is worth considering in more detail. 
A. Murray’s Lessee Decision in February 1856 
By 1856, the U.S. Supreme Court had said little about due 
process.  Several state courts had used due process clauses (or similar 
“law of the land” clauses) of state constitutions to implement 
substantive principles of generality, impartiality, vested rights, or 
equality,41 but those state court decisions met considerable 
 
 38  Charles E. Littlefield & J.B. Henderson, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 281, 
285 (1902).   
 39  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. 272; Cf. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 553–54 
(1853).  Chief Justice Taney’s brief remarks in Bloomer about due process were dicta, 
and moreover were correct; if Congress offers no compensation as required by the 
Fifth Amendment, and then takes property contrary to the Takings Clause, then that 
is a due process violation, but in a remedial rather than substantive sense.  As the 
Court would later correctly explain in 1856, a process is not due process of law if it 
conflicts with any other provision of the Constitution.  See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 
277.  
 40  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857). 
 41  When he introduced the Bill of Rights, Madison said that, “equality of 
mankind . . . is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at 
the head of a Constitution.”  1 Annals of Congress 454 (June 8, 1789).  But this 
equality principle has been read into due process.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954).  Bolling could have and should have been decided on other grounds.  See 
MICHAEL MCCONNELL, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 168 
(Jack Balkin ed., 2001). 
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resistance.42  Moreover, those state cases were decided in the context 
of state constitutions, which were substantially different from the 
federal one; the United States Constitution contains many distinctive 
clauses that are relevant to interpretation of the Due Process Clause.  
For example, the Supremacy Clause makes the “laws of the United 
States” part of the “law of the land”; also, the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights other than the Fifth Amendment are formulated as separate 
amendments so that the states could choose to reject them 
simultaneously with ratifying the Fifth Amendment.  Additionally, the 
Fugitive Slave Clause shows that the framers and ratifiers used the 
words “due” and “law” even to accomplish what many of them 
realized was unjust.43 
By 1856, there was not a single federal appellate substantive due 
process case, which speaks to the difference between the 
jurisprudence of the federal government as compared to the few state 
judicial decisions that had embraced the doctrine.  Some 
Republicans did substantively interpret the word “law” as limiting 
what rules a legislature could enact.44  However, that was not remotely 
the predominant antebellum view among Republicans or within the 
country as a whole.45  If a legislative enactment met the definition of a 
“rule,” then it was very widely considered to be a “law,” unless it 
violated a constitutional provision. 
 
 42  See, e.g., Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1 (1834), overturned by Mial v. Ellington, 
134 N.C. 131 (1903).  Hoke was the foremost such decision to date.  See Williams, 
supra note 21, at 461.  Years later, judges agreed that Hoke “stands out in strong 
contrast . . . to every published decision and opinion on the subject which we have 
ever seen.”  Conner v. Mayor of N.Y., 2 Sandf. 355, 373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849), aff’d 5 
N.Y. 285 (1851).  In 1843, a state court held that taking property for private roads 
violated due process.  See Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 145–46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).  
That was overruled by constitutional change in 1846.  See CHARLES MCCURDY, THE 
ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND POLITICS, 1839–1865, at 284 (2001).  By 1856, 
the leading state substantive due process case was Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 
392–93 (1856).  Courts in twelve states rejected it, as would the federal courts, and 
far fewer states accepted it than rejected it.  See BERNARD STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER 
BROOKE TANEY 415 n.154 (1922); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657, 669 (1887). 
 43  See generally Andrew Hyman, The Little Word “Due”, 38 AKRON L. R. 1 (2005). 
 44  See, e.g., Giddings, infra note 121. 
 45  See infra notes 121 (Lincoln’s view) and 134 (McLean’s view); see also Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 347 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); THE FEDERALIST No. 62 
(James Madison) (“Law is defined to be a rule of action, but how can that be a rule 
which is little known, and less fixed?”); WENDELL PHILLIPS, REVIEW OF LYSANDER 
SPOONER’S ESSAY ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 7 (1847).  In Ogden, Chief 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Story, wrote that the word “law” is defined as, “a 
rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state.”  Ogden, 25 U.S. at 
347.  No justice disavowed that definition, which was a typical one.  See id. 
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The 1856 United States Supreme Court case of Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land cited several of the state court cases that had employed 
substantive due process.  But those state cases were cited only for the 
procedural notion that due process “generally implies and includes 
actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a 
trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, yet this 
is not universally true.”46 
Murray’s Lessee was the leading antebellum case about due 
process, and was unanimous.47 This opinion described a test for 
whether a process enacted by Congress is due process.48  The Court 
said that the test “must be twofold,” rather than threefold or 
fourfold.49  The twofold test in Murray’s Lessee was as follows: 
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain 
whether this process, enacted by Congress, is due process?  
To this the answer must be twofold.  We must examine the 
Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict 
with any of its provisions.  If not found to be so, we must 
look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding 
existing in the common and statue [sic] law of England, 
before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are 
shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political 
condition by having been acted on by them after the 
settlement of this country.50 
Justice Benjamin R. Curtis spoke for the Court in Murray’s Lessee.  The 
substantive matter in the case was “recovery of balances due to the 
government by a collector of customs,” and the procedural matter 
was whether a summary method of collection would suffice without a 
full trial.51  The Court held that the summary method “cannot be 
denied to be due process of law” as applied to the corresponding 
substantive matter of the case.52  There is no indication that the Court 
 
 46  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 280 (citations omitted).  See generally supra note 42 
(discussing some of the state cases).  See also infra note 57 (discussing what the 
Murray’s Lessee Court meant when it said that due process “generally implies and 
includes” various procedures).  Notice that the due process plank only referenced 
due process in the Fifth Amendment, rather than referencing any similar clauses in 
state constitutions or state cases, and so the prevailing Republican understanding of 
due process was evidently guided by the former more than the latter. 
 47  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. 272. 
 48  Id. at 276–77. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. at 280. 
 52  Id.  
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considered the substantive matter of the case to be part of the 
“process.”53 
The first prong of the twofold test that the Court used in 
Murray’s Lessee (“We must examine the Constitution itself . . .”) had a 
firm foundation in the Fifth Amendment, given that the entire 
United States Constitution is part of the law of the land.54  In this way, 
the Due Process Clause helps to effectuate the rest of the 
Constitution, not just by requiring that the executive branch refrain 
from depriving people of liberty without authorization, but also by 
requiring that Congress itself cannot give such authorization except 
in the form of a law that respects all of the rights enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
The second Murray’s Lessee prong, which required the Court to 
look at old English law that settlers had brought to America, suggests 
that old processes would comply with due process, without forbidding 
alternative new processes.55  Had the second Murray’s Lessee prong 
categorically insisted upon old processes, then it would have lacked 
the sort of firm foundation upon which the first prong rested, and 
would have amounted to a straitjacket preventing legislative 
innovation.56  Pursuant to its second prong, the Court in Murray’s 
 
 53  The word “process” in the Due Process Clause had often been defined 
procedurally.  See, e.g., JOHN BOUVIER, 2 A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 373 (2d Edition 1843) (defining “process” as the 
“means or method of accomplishing a thing,” at the last full paragraph on the page). 
 54  See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277.  The Court stated that the words “due 
process of law” have the “same meaning” as the words by “the law of the land” in 
Magna Carta.  Id. at 276.  Cf. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 663 (1833) (Due Process Clause is “an enlargement of the 
language of Magna Carta”).  
 55  The Court later said that “it by no means follows” from the second Murray 
Lessee’s prong that there can be no innovation.  See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516, 528–29 (1884).  The Hurtado Court claimed power to decide whether innovative 
statutes are valid.  Id. at 537.  That claim covered both procedure and substance.  Id. 
at 533.  Robert Yates foresaw that the Court would, “give such a meaning to the 
constitution in all cases where it can possibly be done, as will enlarge the sphere of 
their own authority.”  Brutus, no. XI (January 31, 1788) in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 419–21 (Storing ed., 1981). 
 56  Edward Coke said that “due process of law” is satisfied by following the “law of 
the land,” which he defined in turn as “common law, statute law, or custom.”  See 
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45–46 
(1797).  Notice that Coke included “statute law.”  According to Justice Scalia, Coke 
believed that due process referred “to the customary procedures to which freemen 
were entitled by ‘the old law of England.’”  Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Indeed, Coke said that the words “due 
process” in a certain act were “declaratory of the old law of England.”  See COKE, 
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Lessee listed several procedural features, and said that due process 
“generally implies and includes” them.57  Like the seventeenth-
century writings of the eminent English jurist Edward Coke (which 
the Court cited), the second Murray’s Lessee prong did not preclude 
statutory innovation.58  That second prong basically counseled a 
review of history to see how similar matters had been handled in the 
past.  Even if the second Murray’s Lessee prong had purported to 
prevent any statutory innovation,59 still it applied to procedure rather 
than substance, which is evidenced by the second prong’s 
requirement that “modes of proceeding” must be considered.60 
After describing its twofold test, the Court in Murray’s Lessee 
proceeded to apply the test in reverse order,61 first reviewing the 
historical methods used to recover funds owed to the government, 
and then analyzing compatibility of the disputed summary process 
with various provisions of the Constitution.  In that way, the historical 
 
supra, at 50.  But Coke merely meant that the act he was talking about reiterated 
existing law, and Coke made this clear in his book’s introduction (which he called a 
“proeme”).  See id. at Proeme (“[T]he prudent reader may . . . know whether the 
statute be introductory of a new law, or declaratory of the old . . . .”)  The page in 
question is the seventh page of the proeme.  Id.   
 57  See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 280 (due process “generally implies and 
includes. . .a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings”).  The 
Court may have merely meant that general common law procedural principles apply 
unless altered by legislatures.  See generally NATHAN DANE, 6 GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND 
DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW §182 art. 5, 230 (1823) (when “a statute makes an offence, 
and is silent as to the mode of trial, it shall be by jury, according to the course of the 
common law”). 
 58  Coke stated that at least one type of statutory innovation would conflict with 
Magna Carta’s “law of the land” clause.  He wrote that, when a statute delegates 
excessive discretion to judges, then the resulting judicial fiats are not “laws” and so 
cannot be used to take property consistent with Magna Carta.  See COKE, supra note 
56, at 51; see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (“important subjects . . . 
must be entirely regulated by the legislature”).  This non-delegation principle is also 
embodied in the clause vesting “all legislative powers” in Congress (and so it is 
subsumed in the first prong of Murray’s Lessee). 
 59  Justice Curtis authored a circuit court opinion in 1852 that relied upon a “law 
of the land” clause in a state constitution, to prevent procedural innovation.  See 
Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135, 1140 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764).  That decision 
encountered strong opposition, including from Horace Greeley (later a lead author 
of the 1860 platform), which may help to explain why Curtis’s Murray’s Lessee opinion 
was more restrained.  See STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 
102 (2005). 
 60  The Court said that it must look to ancient “settled usages and modes of 
proceeding.”  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 277.  Those “settled usages” included 
substantive usages, which the Court examined to determine what corresponding 
modes of proceeding were applicable.  Id. 
 61  See G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY AND THE CONSTITUTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 157 
(2007). 
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review informed the compatibility analysis. 
For present purposes, the Murray’s Lessee opinion is not just 
important as court precedent, but also as an explanation of what 
Republicans thought about due process.  There is nothing in the text 
or history of the 1860 due process plank that deviates from the non-
substantive meaning of Murray’s Lessee, Coke, and the Fifth 
Amendment. 
B. Republican Convention in June 1856 
As mentioned, the Murray’s Lessee case was decided unanimously, 
and among those signing off on it was Justice John McLean, who was 
an active politician while serving on the Court.62  A few months after 
Murray’s Lessee was decided, Justice McLean was runner-up to John 
Fremont for the 1856 Republican presidential nomination (while 
Lincoln was runner-up for the 1856 vice-presidential nomination), 
and in that role McLean was particularly relevant to the development 
of the 1856 Republican platform.63 
A former Pennsylvania congressman and state court judge 
named David Wilmot chaired the platform committee at the 1856 
Republican convention in Philadelphia (he had become famous for 
introducing the “Wilmot Proviso” in Congress to limit slavery), and 
he presented to that convention a plank that would eventually 
become the basis for the similar due process plank at the 1860 
convention.64  The plank read as follows in 1856 (this can be 
compared to the shorter 1860 plank which is recited above in the 
Introduction): 
Resolved, That with our Republican fathers we hold it to be a 
self-evident truth that all men are endowed with the 
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, and that the primary object and ulterior designs 
of our Federal Government were to secure these rights to 
all persons within its exclusive jurisdiction—that as our 
Republican fathers, when they had abolished Slavery in all 
our National Territory, ordained that no person should be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law, it becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the 
Constitution against all attempts to violate it for the 
purpose of establishing Slavery in the Territories of the 
 
 62  See FRANCIS WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 139–52 (1937). 
 63  See infra note 129.  
 64  HENRY WILSON, RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 512 (1884). 
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United States by positive legislation, prohibiting its 
existence or extension therein.  That we deny the authority 
of Congress, of a Territorial Legislature, of any individual or 
association of individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery 
in any Territory of the United States, while the present 
Constitution shall be maintained.65 
In addition to Wilmot, the authors of the 1856 due process plank 
included Ohio Congressman Joshua Giddings.66  Both Wilmot and 
Giddings supported McLean for president in preference to Fremont, 
who eventually lost the presidential election to James Buchanan.67 
Among other things, the 1856 platform declared that 
Republicans were “opposed to the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise” (this language was eventually removed by the authors 
of the 1860 platform).68  By supporting reinstatement of the Missouri 
Compromise, Republicans in their 1856 platform suggested a 
willingness to allow continuance of slavery in some southern territory, 
meaning that they believed federal recognition and regulation of 
slavery did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause.  That 
compromise had, for example, enabled the territorial government of 
Arkansas to maintain slavery,69 and in 1836 Arkansas became a slave 
 
 65  Republican National Convention, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1856, at 1 (original 
emphasis).  This was the platform’s second resolution.  Some versions used “shall” 
instead of “should.”  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27.  The fourth 
resolution in 1856 mentioned due process too.  Id.  See generally infra note 116 
(Bingham discussing due process violation in Kansas).  Notice the lack of quotation 
marks in the 1856 plank, unlike in the 1860 plank.   
 66  The Republican Platform, NATIONAL ERA, Jan. 1, 1857, at 2.  Gideon Welles, 
Francis Blair, and John McLean helped write the plank.  See JOHN NIVEN, GIDEON 
WELLES: LINCOLN’S SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 273 (1973); infra note 129 (McLean). 
Giddings said he wrote it.  JOSHUA REED GIDDINGS, HISTORY OF THE REBELLION: ITS 
AUTHORS AND CAUSES 397–98 (1864).  But Giddings sometimes magnified his own 
importance.  See GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 335.  Preston King and David Wilmot were 
also influential in writing the platform.  Id. at 337.  The 1856 plank was not the first 
of its kind; in 1852, for example, the fourth plank of the Free Democratic Platform 
cited the Due Process Clause in combination with a lack of federal enslavement 
power, and concluded that the federal government should stop perpetuating slavery.  
See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 18. 
 67  The Philadelphia Convention, NATIONAL ERA at 102 (June 26, 1856).  Other 
supporters of McLean over Fremont included John Bingham and Thaddeus Stevens.  
See WEISENBURGER,  supra note 62, at 150–51. 
 68  See, e.g., PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27 (preamble of 1856 platform).  
The Missouri Compromise barred territorial slavery in the old Louisiana Territory 
farther north than Tennessee, except in the planned state of Missouri.  See Missouri 
Compromise, 3 Stat. 545 (1820). 
 69  See ORVILLE TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN ARKANSAS 23 (1958).  
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state.70 
But the 1856 platform also declared that, “it is both the right 
and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories 
those twin relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.”71 This 
language was also eventually removed by the authors of the 1860 
platform.72  This 1856 statement in the platform was evidently a 
response to the demise of the Missouri Compromise rather than an 
expression of constitutional principle, given the same platform’s 
support for the Missouri Compromise.  But as we shall see, 
Republican opinions in 1856 were not monolithic. 
C. Dred Scott Decision in 1857 
Chief Justice Roger Taney used due process as part of his 
argument forbidding Congress to ban slavery in federal territory in 
the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.73  All justices in that case agreed that 
the Bill of Rights applied against the federal government throughout 
the country, including the territories.74  Taney wrote the opinion of 
the Court, including this oft-quoted sentence: 
And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the 
United States of his liberty or property, merely because he 
came himself or brought his property into a particular 
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no 
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the 
name of due process of law.75 
Taney did not spell out the source of his assumption that there had 
been “no offence against the laws” (which I call his “no-offense 
assumption”), but it is likely that he did not derive it from the Due 
Process Clause, given that due process was a relatively small part of 
his argument.76  Later in his opinion, Taney made an enumerated 
powers argument, inferring from Article IV of the Constitution that, 
“[t]he only power conferred [upon Congress over slavery] is the 
power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in 
 
 70  Id. at 46. 
 71  See, e.g., PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27 (third resolution of 1856 
platform). 
 72  Id. at 31–33. 
 73  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857). 
 74  See id. at 614–15 (Curtis, J., dissenting).  See generally Charles E. Littlefield & 
J.B. Henderson, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1902).  
 75  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.  
 76  See DEAK NABERS, VICTORY OF LAW 103 (2006).   
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his rights.”77  That strained inference from Article IV would explain 
his no-offense assumption.  Alternatively, Taney might have meant 
that a valid territorial emancipation law would have to offer 
compensation to the slave-owner per the Takings Clause.78  Either 
way, Taney’s statement about due process relied upon a conflict 
between congressional action and other material in the Constitution, 
and the summary paragraph toward the end of his opinion did not 
broadly construe or even mention the Due Process Clause.79  Thus, 
Taney did not reject the non-substantive Murray’s Lessee test, and the 
dissenting justices in Dred Scott would likely have criticized such a 
rejection if it had occurred. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis did not employ 
substantive due process either.  On the contrary, Curtis placed 
discretion squarely with Congress: 
The purpose and object of the [territories] clause . . . being 
to enable Congress to provide a body of municipal law for 
the government of the settlers, the allowance or the 
prohibition comes within the known and recognized scope 
of that purpose and object. . . . Regulations must be 
needful; but it is necessarily left to the legislative discretion 
to determine whether a law be needful.  No other clause of 
the Constitution has been referred to at the bar, or has 
been seen by me, which imposes any restriction.80 
Curtis was a Whig rather than a Republican, but his Dred Scott dissent 
was widely accepted by Republicans, perhaps even more than 
McLean’s dissent, as the official response to Taney’s opinion.81  Curtis 
personally supported abolition of slavery, but like most Republicans 
 
 77  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.  See also DON FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: 
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW & POLITICS 381 (1978) (Taney relied on a 
delegation of powers argument distinct from a due process argument).  
 78  See U.S. CONST. amend V.  See also PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A 
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 40 (1997).  I no longer believe that Taney invoked 
substantive due process, given that he did not suggest his no-offense assumption was 
a consequence of the Due Process Clause.  Doubtless, Taney would have employed 
substantive due process if he felt that it was a legitimate argument to make.  Had 
Taney employed that doctrine, then it would be difficult to now avoid concluding 
that his opinion (with all the others in the case) demolished the precedent of 
Murray’s Lessee by not even mentioning it. 
 79  See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 380–81 (the summary paragraph to which 
Fehrenbacher refers is the paragraph by Taney that begins, “Now, as we have already 
said in an earlier part . . . .”). 
 80  Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 615–16 (Curtis, J., dissenting).  Curtis did discuss due 
process, but only to infer from history that Taney was misapplying it to similar facts, 
rather than to describe what due process meant.  Id. at 624–27. 
 81  See DON FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS 214 (1981). 
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he did not reflexively deny its constitutionality.82  Curtis’s dissent did 
not mention Murray’s Lessee, likely because he believed that no 
governmental deprivation of property occurred in the Dred Scott case, 
which meant that there was no due process requirement.83 
Justice McLean was the only dissenter in Dred Scott other than 
Curtis.  McLean’s opinion, like Taney’s opposing opinion, asserted 
that the finite power delegated to Congress by Article IV meant that 
congressional power over the territories was substantively limited.  
While Taney argued that Congress could not institute freedom there, 
McLean argued that Congress could not institute slavery there: 
[T]here is no power in the Constitution by which Congress 
can make either white or black men slaves. In organizing 
the Government of a Territory, Congress is limited to 
means appropriate to the attainment of the constitutional 
object. No powers can be exercised which are prohibited by 
the Constitution, or which are contrary to its spirit; so that, 
whether the object may be the protection of the persons 
and property of purchasers of the public lands, or of 
communities who have been annexed to the Union by 
conquest or purchase, they are initiatory to the 
establishment of State Governments, and no more power 
can be claimed or exercised than is necessary to the 
attainment of the end. This is the limitation of all the 
Federal powers.84 
This was an enumerated powers argument, rather than a substantive 
due process argument.  McLean’s dissent did not mention Murray’s 
Lessee because he did not mention due process at all.  No judge in 
 
 82  The 1860 GOP platform affirmed the constitutionality of slavery within the 
individual states: “the maintenance inviolate of the . . .  right of each state, to order 
and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, 
is essential. . . .”  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32.  See generally Russell v. 
Barney, 21 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1855) (Justice McLean holding that the 
Due Process Clause is “not obligatory on the states”). 
 83  See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 625 (Curtis., J., dissenting) (writing that “the status of 
slavery must depend on the municipal law”).  See also BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC 
LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 103 (2006).  Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott might 
have cited Murray’s Lessee if that earlier decision had been mentioned by the dissents, 
or if Taney’s due process discussion had been longer than a single sentence.  See DON 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 678 n.24 (1978). 
 84  Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 542–43 (McLean, J., dissenting).  McLean also said that 
Congress had discretion whether or not to prohibit slaves “from becoming settlers” 
in an otherwise free territory, and said that it would be satisfactory for Congress to 
allow a slave or free territory to remain so, “until the people form a State 
Constitution.”  Id.  McLean had made these arguments before.  See, e.g., infra text 
accompanying notes 132 and 167. 
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Dred Scott relied in any way upon substantive due process. 
D. Republican Convention in 1860 
By 1860, there were several thousand slaves in the District of 
Columbia,85 while fewer than one hundred were counted elsewhere in 
exclusive federal jurisdictions.86  Once Republicans won the 1860 
election and had control of the White House and Congress, war 
broke out in 1861, and in 1862 Republicans in Congress banned 
slavery in the District before proceeding with emancipation 
everywhere else.87  Given the Republican desire to eliminate federal 
support for slavery in the District of Columbia, the omission of the 
District from the 1860 due process plank has added significance, and 
shows that they believed slavery in the District was a statutory rather 
than constitutional matter. 
The 1860 Republican convention was not a homogeneous 
meeting of radical abolitionists, and their platform was not intended 
for such an audience.  The convention was united regarding non-
extension of slavery, but divided on abolition where slavery already 
existed.88  Radicalism on slavery meant defeat at the polls, and the 
moderates sought to contain the radicals while retaining their 
support.89  Historians have disagreed about whether the 1860 
platform was a defeat of the radicals over the conservatives, or vice 
 
 85  1 FREEDOM: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF EMANCIPATION, 1861–1867, at 165 (Ira 
Berlin et al. eds., 1982) (“The commissioners awarded compensation for a total of 
2,989 slaves.”).  
 86  The Progress of Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1861 at 4 (the 1860 Census 
counted 3,181 slaves in the District of Columbia, but less than one hundred in the 
territories).  Of course, those numbers do not address the potential that existed for 
future slave population.  Nor did the 1860 census apparently count people in the 
unorganized territory that would later become Oklahoma, where thousands of 
African Americans were enslaved by Native Americans.  See, e.g., ARRELL GIBSON, THE 
HISTORY OF OKLAHOMA 60 (1984). 
 87  See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376.  Then Congress banned slavery in 
the territories, but not in federal forts and dockyards.  See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 
12 Stat. 432; FONER, supra note 9, at 203.  Then Lincoln declared freedom in rebel 
states.  See Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (September 22, 1862), in 6 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 96 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).  
Congress compensated owners in the District, but not in the territories.  See CONG. 
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2052–54 (May 9, 1862).  Compensation for 
emancipation of slaves is addressed in the Fourteenth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend XIV, § 4. 
 88  HENRY HARRISON SMITH, ALL THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS FROM 
PHILADELPHIA, JUNE 17, 1856, at 19 (1896) (quoting John Kasson). 
 89  EDWARD YOUNGER, JOHN A. KASSON: POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY FROM LINCOLN TO 
MCKINLEY 94–95 (1955). 
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versa.90  Doubtless the truth is different for different planks. 
The due process plank was not merely a rhetorical flourish91 or 
unnecessary argumentation.92  The subcommittee that wrote the 1860 
due process plank included lawyers, judges, and elected officials; 
skilled wordsmiths, “men opposed only to the extension of slavery, 
but also abolitionists.”93 According to John Hay and John Nicolay, 
who were assistants to Abraham Lincoln, the platform of 1860 was 
“framed with remarkable skill.”94  Political motivations were very 
much in play, one of which was to inspire northerners who were 
reluctant to take an anti-slavery stand unless those northerners were 
convinced that the Constitution was at least in some way anti-slavery.95 
David Wilmot attended the 1860 convention, where he 
explained: “It is our purpose to restore the Constitution to its original 
meaning; to give to it its true interpretation; to read that instrument 
as our fathers read it.  (Applause.)”96  According to historians, there is 
“no evidence that the Fifth Amendment was intended as a 
prohibition of the existence of slavery anywhere within the national 
 
 90  ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 132 (1995). 
 91  Cf. Allan Nevins, The Constitution, Slavery, and the Territories, in THE GASPAR G. 
BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1950, at 98 
(1953) (noting that “recent scholars” have generally viewed platforms “as window-
dressing or stage-scenery”). 
 92  Cf. Thomas Ewing, Speech of the Hon. Thomas Ewing at Chillicothe, Ohio, THE 
WORLD: NEW YORK, Oct. 3, 1860, at 6 (“It seems to be there for no other purpose than 
to give opponents [of slavery] advantage in the argument.”).  Ewing formerly was a 
cabinet secretary, and U.S. Senator.  WILLIAM HENRY SMITH, HISTORY OF THE CABINET 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM PRESIDENT WASHINGTON TO PRESIDENT 
COOLIDGE 202 (1925). 
 93  See YOUNGER, supra note 89, at 102.  The subcommittee had five official 
members.  See SMITH, supra note 88, at 19. They were: William Jessup (chair), a 
former state judge in Pennsylvania; Horace Greeley, founder of the New York Tribune; 
John Kasson, an Iowa lawyer who later served in Congress; Frederick Tracy, a county 
attorney from San Francisco; and Austin Blair, a lawyer, prosecutor, and legislator 
who later was Governor of Michigan. Kasson was the lead author.  See SMITH, supra 
note 88, at 18.  Others involved with the subcommittee were Carl Schurz, William 
Otto, Gustave Koerner, and Eli Thayer.  See YOUNGER, supra note 89, at 404 n.22. 
 94  JOHN NICOLAY AND JOHN HAY, 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY 267 (1909).  
Later, Hay served as Secretary of State, and Nicolay served as marshal of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
 95  See FONER, supra note 90, at 85. 
 96  CHARLES GOING, DAVID WILMOT, FREE SOILER: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT 
AUTHOR OF THE WILMOT PROVISO 530 (1924).  Likewise, in 1856, Wilmot urged 
Pennsylvania Republicans to revere “the Constitution as interpreted by its framers.”  
Id. at 482. 
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jurisdiction.”97  Only in combination with other clauses, such as the 
Territories Clause, could the Due Process Clause contribute to 
prohibiting the existence of slavery. 
Once Lincoln was nominated, some conservative Republicans 
asserted that the due process plank had erroneously denied 
congressional authority regarding the territories.98  However, those 
conservatives did not go so far as to suggest that the plank’s denial of 
congressional authority had been entirely based on due process, 
much less that the denial applied to the District.99 
III. WRITING THE PLANK SO AS TO AVOID INTRA-PARTY CONTROVERSY 
The Republican platform of 1860 “was unusually successful in 
avoiding points of controversy among its followers,” according to Hay 
and Nicolay.100  Diversity of opinion helps to explain why the 
constitutionality of slavery in the District was not disputed in the 
platform. 
A. Abraham Lincoln’s Views 
Lincoln’s opinion warrants special attention, given his lead role 
in 1860.  Directly giving his opinion about the District of Columbia, 
he said that slavery there was constitutional, though deplorable.  He 
put it this way on August 27, 1858: 
I do not stand today pledged to the abolition of slavery in 
the District of Columbia. . . . I should be exceedingly glad to 
see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. . . . [I]t 
would be upon these conditions.  First, that the abolition 
should be gradual.  Second, that it should be on a vote of the 
majority of qualified voters in the District, and third, that 
compensation should be made to unwilling owners.101 
 
 97  See FONER, supra note 90, at 85. 
 98  See Ewing, supra note 92; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1385 (March 2, 
1861) (Rep. Baker).  Those speeches by Ewing and Baker suggest that the word 
“authority” in the plank meant constitutional power rather than moral authority.  Cf. 
Manuscript Draft of the Republican National Convention of 1860, Kasson Papers (State 
Historical Society of Iowa) (the words “constitutional authority” were shortened to 
“authority”).  
 99  Id.  
 100  See NICOLAY & HAY, supra note 94, at 267.  
 101  RICHARD STRINER, FATHER ABRAHAM: LINCOLN’S RELENTLESS STRUGGLE TO END 
SLAVERY 79 (2006) (describing a debate between Lincoln and Douglas in Freeport, 
Illinois).  Gradual abolition typically meant slaves born after a certain date could be 
free.  Lincoln had worked on this in Congress.  See HARLAN HORNER, LINCOLN AND 
GREELEY 54 (1954). 
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Lincoln’s notes written a few weeks later confirm that he had a non-
substantive understanding of due process with regard to deprivations 
of property, and by extension deprivations of liberty: 
The Constitution itself impliedly admits that a person may 
be deprived of property by “due process of law,” and the 
Republicans hold that if there be a law of Congress or 
territorial legislature telling the slaveholder in advance that 
he shall not bring his slave into the Territory on pain of 
forfeiture, and he still will bring him, he will be deprived of 
his property in such slave by “due process of law.”102 
His continued public and private statements about the District show 
that Lincoln always held to his non-substantive view.103  He did not 
dispute that the Bill of Rights restrained the federal government both 
inside the states and outside.104  It appears that the only passage that 
anyone has ever relied upon to suggest that Lincoln actually 
sympathized with substantive due process is the following from an 
1854 speech: 
It is said that the slaveholder has the same [political] right 
to take his negroes to Kansas that a freeman has to take his 
hogs or his horses.  This would be true if negroes were 
property in the same sense that hogs and horses are.  But is 
this so?  It is notoriously not so.105 
According to Professor Mark Graber, this passage shows Lincoln’s 
position was that men had a substantive due process right to take 
property (like hogs) into territories.106  But Professor Graber muddles 
the distinction between different types of rights.  The quoted speech 
explicitly distinguished between legal, social, political, natural, and 
 
 102  Fragment: Notes for Speeches, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 97, 
101 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  These notes from 1858 were likely not spoken.  The 
debater who opened set the agenda.  THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES xxiv (Davis and 
Wilson eds., 2008). 
 103  See Debate at Quincy, Ill. (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  See also MICHAEL BURLINGAME, 1 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A LIFE 343 (2008); Letter from Lincoln to John Gilmer (Dec. 15, 
1860), in LINCOLN ON RACE AND SLAVERY 212 (Henry Gates ed., 2009).  Lincoln 
approved emancipation in D.C.  See Emancipation in the District—Mr. Lincoln’s 
Opinions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1862, at 4 (Lincoln declined “vetoing an act of 
Congress on other than Constitutional grounds”). 
 104  See Charles E. Littlefield & J.B. Henderson, The Insular Cases, 15 HARV. L. REV. 
281, 283 (1901). 
 105  Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (Oct. 4, 1854), in 2 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (brackets in 
original).  Lincoln was still a Whig.  See FONER, supra note 9, at 63, 69 (on October 16, 
1854, Lincoln identified himself as “an old Whig”). 
 106  See GRABER, supra note 3, at 63.  
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constitutional rights, without classifying this one as a constitutional 
right much less as a substantive due process right.  Lincoln covered 
this same topic repeatedly,107 and carefully contrasted different types 
of rights.108 Despite hating slavery, he did not believe that 
governmental maintenance of slavery necessarily violated due 
process.  As one author has put it, “Lincoln’s prime directive was how 
to rid the nation of slavery without undermining the nation’s system 
of self-government.”109 
As in the District of Columbia, slavery was common within the 
unorganized tract of federal land that would later become the state of 
Oklahoma.110 Lincoln discussed this during an 1854 speech, before he 
joined the Republican Party: 
[W]e never attempted to prohibit slavery as to it.  I wish 
particular attention to this.  It adjoins the original Missouri 
Compromise line, by its northern boundary; and 
consequently is part of the country, into which, by 
implication, slavery was permitted to go, by that 
compromise. . . . In all our struggles to prohibit slavery 
within our Mexican acquisitions, we never so much as lifted 
a finger to prohibit it, as to this tract.  Is not this conclusive 
that at all times, we have held the Missouri Compromise as a 
sacred thing; even when against ourselves, as well as when 
 
 107  Abraham Lincoln, Speech (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 264 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“I admit this is perfectly logical, if 
there is no difference between hogs and negroes.”); Abraham Lincoln, Speech (Oct. 7, 
1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 226 (Roy P. Basler ed., 
1953) (“That is perfectly logical if the two species of property are alike.”). 
 108  See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in RICHARD 
GILDER AND DANIEL FISH, 6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (1905) 
(disclaiming a “lawful right” to interfere with slavery in southern states though slavery 
“is wrong”). 
 109  Lucas E. Morel, Abraham Lincoln: The Better Angel of Our Nature, 29 J. ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN ASS’N 51, 52 (2008).  Before the Civil War, Lincoln and most other leading 
Republicans understood that slavery inherently deprived people of liberty, in 
particular the God-given liberty that the Declaration of Independence had famously 
invoked.  See ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 138 (2012).  Years later, Lincoln reiterated that 
people like himself who “declare for liberty . . . mean for each man to do as he 
pleases with himself and the product of his labor . . . .”  See FONER, supra note 9, at 
276 (describing Lincoln’s 1864 speech at a Sanitary Fair in Baltimore).  What 
Lincoln said is as important as what he did not say; Lincoln did not claim that the 
Due Process Clause declares for liberty, or that “due process” should be redefined, or 
that the God-given liberty to do as one pleases with one’s self and the product of 
one’s labor is the only liberty worth recognizing.  See id. 
 110  See GIBSON, supra note 86, at 60. 
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for us? 111 
Lincoln made this Peoria speech shortly after the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act of May 1854 had virtually nullified the Missouri Compromise,112 
and he evidently saw nothing unconstitutional about permitting 
slavery in the Oklahoma tract, even though he deplored it.  Four 
years later (by which time the Missouri Compromise had been 
attacked in Dred Scott), Lincoln was echoing the 1856 Republican 
platform: “I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the 
right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States 
Territories.”113  The part of the 1856 plank that he was echoing was 
not the due process plank, however,114 and there is no indication that 
Lincoln ever believed he had advocated anything unconstitutional in 
his 1854 Peoria speech. 
B. John Bingham’s Views 
Some Republican leaders of that era did believe that federally-
maintained slavery in the District was unconstitutional.  One 
particularly relevant example is Ohio Congressman John Bingham, 
later the lead author of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Bingham said that the Due Process Clause applied in full force 
to protect all persons in the District, but he cited that clause in 
combination with other substantive clauses to argue for the 
unconstitutionality of slavery.115  In other words, Bingham was 
reasoning just as the United States Supreme Court had instructed in 
1856 (“examine the Constitution itself, to see whether this process be 
in conflict with any of its provisions”).116 
For example, in 1857, Bingham cited the Due Process Clause in 
 
 111  Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 1854), in 2 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 258 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  The Missouri 
Compromise is discussed supra at note 68. 
 112  Kansas-Nebraska Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277. 
 113  Debate at Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 40 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis in original). 
 114  See infra note 162 (quoting third resolution of 1856 platform). 
 115  See Stephen Halbrook, Second-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the 
District of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 105, 131–32, 144–45 (1995) (discussing 
various speeches by Bingham). 
 116  See Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 59 
U.S. 272, 277 (1856).  In 1856, Bingham decried an act in Kansas Territory that 
“abridges freedom of speech” and so he aptly inferred a due process violation.  See 
CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 124 App. (1856).  This matter appears in the 
fourth resolution of the 1856 platform.  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27–
28. 
HYMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  2:54 PM 
252 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:229 
 
combination with the Titles of Nobility Clause against slavery.117  
Further, in 1862, he cited the Due Process Clause in combination 
with the Privileges and Immunities Clause against slavery.118  In the 
latter speech, he urged legislation to free “all American citizens held to 
service or labor within the District,” in preference to legislation 
aimed more broadly at freeing “all persons” held as slaves in the 
District.119  In these speeches, Bingham’s interpretation of the Due 
Process Clause was orthodox and non-substantive, though he had an 
unorthodox interpretation of the Titles of Nobility Clause and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.120  As for Bingham’s belief that 
governmental maintenance and enforcement of slavery in the District 
deprived people of liberty (with or without due process of law), that 
belief seems to have been undisputed by Republicans, including 
Lincoln. 
After the Civil War, Bingham said that the word “law” in the Due 
Process Clause means “the perfection of human reason,” but in 
context he was seeking more congressional power to perfect state law, 
 
 117  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Title of Nobility Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 
3D SESS., 140 App. (1857).  Two years later, Bingham criticized an Oregon law that 
gave legal aliens the right to vote notwithstanding that the Constitution only allows 
citizens to vote; he contrasted that citizenship requirement with the protection that 
the Due Process Clause and Takings Clause collectively provide for any “person,” not 
merely any “citizen.”  See CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 2D SESS., 982–83 (Feb. 11, 1859).  
As usual, he did not cite the Due Process Clause all by itself. 
 118  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (Privileges and Immunities Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 
37TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1637–39 (1862). 
 119  CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 1637–39 (1862) (emphasis added).   
 120  The orthodox view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was that it did not 
limit how a state treats its own citizens.  See, e.g., Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 420 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (Justice Baldwin called it a “grant by the people of the state in 
convention, to the citizens of all the other states of the Union, of the privileges and 
immunities of the citizens of this state”).  This clause did not protect natural rights 
even when those rights were listed in state constitutions, except insofar as such rights 
were already enforceable by the state’s own citizens.  See generally Robert Natelson, 
The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REV. 1117, 1188 
(2009) (noting that “any privileges a state granted to its citizens in vindication of 
those [natural] rights had to be extended to visitors”).  When a natural right was 
enforceable by certain persons, it was often deemed a “privilege.”  See 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 159–61 (1st ed., 1765) (stating 
that legislators have “privilege of speech”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION § 863 (1833) (same).  Vindication of a natural right is deemed a 
“privilege” by the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Suspension Clause 
protects liberty).  The last (supplementary) resolution at the 1860 convention cited 
violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, with regard to men who had been 
driven out of their adopted states on account of their opinions.  See SMITH supra note 
88, at 23; cf. PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 33 (the platform did not include this 
resolution). 
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rather than suggesting the clause gives to the judiciary power to strike 
enactments that the judges deem imperfect.121  Bingham believed that 
the Due Process Clause applies to any “person,” and that it 
consequently applies to rich and poor alike, to weak and strong, to 
citizen and non-citizen, et cetera.122  Instead of following from 
substantive due process, this aspect of the clause apparently flows 
from its plain text, which does not include any limits as to the type of 
“person.” 
C. Other Divergent Views About Slavery in District of Columbia 
David Wilmot, who presented the 1856 version of the plank to 
the Republican convention in Philadelphia, and who also spoke at 
the 1860 convention in Chicago, took the position that Congress 
possessed discretion to either make slavery legal or illegal in the 
District.  For example, Wilmot said in 1849 that slavery would “remain 
perpetual” in the District absent congressional action, which could be 
taken or not taken as a matter of “propriety or policy.”123 
Thus, there were diverging opinions regarding whether 
governmental maintenance of slavery in the District was 
constitutional; Lincoln and Wilmot were among those who said it was, 
while Bingham was among those who said it was not.  The differing 
opinions of some other leading Republicans of that era are addressed 
elsewhere in this Article.  That diversity of opinion helps to explain 
why slavery in the District was not explicitly discussed in the 1860 
platform, though the implication of the platform was that 
government-supported slavery was not an inherent due process 
violation.  For the platform to explicitly discuss slavery in the 
territories was unproblematic and unavoidable, given the high profile 
 
 121  See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1094 (1866).  The pending 
constitutional amendment said: “Congress shall have power to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper to secure . . . equal protection in the rights of life, 
liberty, and property.”  Id. at 806, 813.  See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 7 (using 
a definition of civil law as “what the legislature deems right”).  See also Abraham 
Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 RICHARD GILDER AND DANIEL FISH, 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 169 (1905) (“[T]he intention of the lawgiver 
is the law.”).  Joshua Giddings felt differently, believing that gross injustice is not 
law.  See Joshua Giddings, Political, Mr. Giddings to Mr. Corwin, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
1859 (“[I]t is no law . . . .”).  Giddings likewise wrote: “the murder or enslavement of 
the humblest of the human family is not merely unjust, but criminal . . . .”  Letter 
from Joshua Giddings to Thomas Ewing (Nov. 7, 1860), in GEORGE WASHINGTON 
JULIAN, THE LIFE OF JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS 383 (1892). 
 122  CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 2ND SESS., 1638 (1862). 
 123  See GOING & WILMOT, supra note 96, at 336. 
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of the Dred Scott case, and given the Republican emphasis on halting 
the spread of slavery rather than uprooting it.  The 1860 platform 
committee’s desire to avoid intra-party controversy was intense, and 
so they would have avoided the controversial doctrine of substantive 
due process, if indeed they were aware of it, especially because 
invoking that doctrine would have pleased only a small minority while 
stirring up trouble about the status of slavery in the District.124 
IV. PLANK REFERS TO AREAS WHERE SLAVERY LACKED LEGAL 
EXISTENCE 
The plank’s omission of the District of Columbia was related to 
the District not being “free soil.”  In the eighteenth century, the 
founders had banned slavery in the then-existing territories, as the 
due process plank explicitly recounted, but had not banned slavery in 
the area of the District of Columbia.125  Ergo, the 1860 plank did not 
oppose slavery in the District, which was not free soil. 
The platform’s treatment of the District was addressed in 
Congress by Lyman Trumbull, a Republican Senator from Illinois 
who would later co-author the great Thirteenth Amendment that 
banned slavery nationwide.126  Trumbull explained in 1859 that the 
due process plank of the 1856 platform had not called into question 
the constitutionality of slavery in the District of Columbia: 
He wanted to know if the slaves are free in the District of 
Columbia by this platform.  No, sir . . . . There may be 
slavery in a country which does not belong to the United 
States; the United States may acquire that country, and may 
not abolish slavery, because the right to hold slaves existed 
when the country was acquired; but it does not follow that if 
the country was free when we acquired it, men could 
afterwards have property in slaves in it; and that is the 
distinction.127 
Statements like this one by Trumbull confirm that no substantive due 
process doctrine was actually endorsed or tolerated in either the 1856 
or the 1860 versions of the plank. 
 
 124  See FONER, supra note 90, at 43.  The substantive interpretation of due process 
was usually viewed as absurd by antebellum Republicans, although it had a following 
within a faction of radical abolitionists.  Id. 
 125  See, e.g., JAN GEISLER, THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 68 (2008). 
 126 See, e.g., HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 221–25 (1913). 
 127  CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 57–58 (1859).  The plank that Trumbull 
was discussing can be found in the text accompanying note 65 supra. 
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As early as 1847, David Wilmot equated extension of slavery into 
free territory with “giving legal existence to slavery,” which is the 
same phraseology of the 1856 and 1860 planks.128  In other words, 
maintaining slavery was a different issue from giving slavery existence, 
according to people like Wilmot, and the due process plank only 
targeted the latter. 
Evidently, Trumbull’s and Wilmot’s position paralleled that of 
the 1856 Republican presidential candidate (and U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice) John McLean, who was deeply involved in developing 
the 1856 platform.129  McLean was familiar with the 1856 platform 
committee members and vice versa.130  He had written in 1847 and 
again in 1856 that Congress lacked complete control over territorial 
slavery, and that Congress had no power to establish territorial slavery 
where it did not already exist.131  But McLean also wrote that Congress 
could provide for the administration of justice among the settlers 
(and consequently prohibit slavery), and that Congress could also 
recognize and regulate pre-existing territorial slavery.132  McLean 
consistently said that Congress had some power to legislate about 
territorial slavery.133  In 1856, McLean publicly wrote to Senator Lewis 
 
 128  JONATHAN EARLE, JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY & THE POLITICS OF FREE SOIL, 1824–
1854, at 138 (2004).  Wilmot asked in 1847, “[s]hall the government of this Republic, 
by the extension of the Missouri Compromise into free territory, give legal existence 
to slavery?”  Id.   
 129  The Republicans’ national convention was from June 17–19, 1856.  On June 
11, McLean outlined a platform.  See WEISENBURGER, supra note 62, at 149.  He 
wanted the Missouri Compromise to be restored, the constitutional rights of both 
free and slave states to be preserved, and “no slavery to be instituted into free 
territory.”  See Reel 11, John McLean papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C. 
 130  See GIENAPP, supra note 4, at 337.   
 131  Id. at 312.   
 132  See John McLean, Has Congress Power to Institute Slavery?, DAILY NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 1856, at 2.  An excerpt follows:  
[Congress] may . . . provide for the administration of justice among the 
settlers, [but] it does by no means follow that they may establish 
slavery. . . . In the Territories of Louisiana and Florida, Congress 
recognized, and to a limited extent regulated slavery.  But, as before 
remarked, slavery existed in those Territories at the time they were 
ceded to the United States. . . .  
Id.  This same essay by McLean had been published anonymously in 1847.  Has 
Congress Power to Institute Slavery?, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, May 22, 1847, at 3.  See 
also 29 THE FRIEND 306–07 (1856).   
 133  Cf. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 143–44.  According to Fehrenbacher, by 
the time of the Dred Scott case, McLean had altered his earlier view that Congress had 
only limited power to legislate concerning territorial slavery, and Fehrenbacher says 
McLean’s Dred Scott dissent agreed with an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall 
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Cass that Congress had discretion to either maintain or forbid slavery 
in a territory, as long as Congress did not establish it in the first place: 
You may recollect that I have, in conversation with you, 
often said that Congress, having the power to establish a 
Territorial Government, might, in the exercise of a police 
power, prohibit slavery, although they had no constitutional 
power to institute it.134 
McLean’s position regarding territorial slavery was based upon the 
limited reach of the Territories Clause.135  This was an enumerated 
powers argument, not a due process argument.  As to the 
constitutionality of slavery in the District of Columbia, McLean wrote 
that it had legally existed when the District came under federal 
control, and, therefore, it never arose as a constitutional issue.136 
Thus, up until the first Republican national convention in 1856, 
McLean’s position about slavery within federal jurisdiction was 
consistent over time, and matched Trumbull’s explanation of the 
1856 due process plank.  For them, the due process plank’s denial of 
federal authority “to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of 
the United States” was inapplicable to locations where slavery already 
had legally existed when those places entered into exclusive federal 
jurisdiction.  McLean’s dissent in Dred Scott took a similar approach.137 
Another key player was Governor Salmon P. Chase of Ohio.  
 
according to which congressional power over the territories was unquestioned.  Id. at 
144.  But Fehrenbacher missed the mark here; McLean continued to assert in his 
Dred Scott opinion that Congress had no power to “make either white or black men 
slaves,” and McLean added that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion to the contrary had 
been “inadvertently uttered.”  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 542 (1857) 
(McLean, J., dissenting). 
 134  Letter from John McLean to Lewis Cass (May 13, 1856), in 29 THE FRIEND 307 
(1856) (emphasis in original).  Generally speaking, McLean believed that judges and 
jurors should follow laws including ones they believe to be wrong.  See Giltner v. 
Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 432 (C.C.D. Mich. 1848) (“However unjust and impolitic 
slavery may be . . . you are sworn to decide this case according to law.”); Jones v. Van 
Zandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C. C. D. Ohio 1843) (“[I]f convictions . . . of what is 
right or wrong, are to be substituted as a rule of action in disregard of the law, we 
shall soon be without law and protection.”). 
 135  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States.”).  See also McLean, supra note 84 and infra note 167, with 
accompanying text (elaborating on his enumerated powers argument). 
 136  See McLean, supra note 132.   
 137  Dred Scott, 60 U.S at 542–43 (McLean, J., dissenting) (McLean  believed that 
Congress could not make anyone into a slave, but Congress had discretion whether 
to allow slaves into an otherwise free territory, and Congress could allow a slave 
territory or free territory to remain so until statehood). 
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Chase was McLean’s son-in-law, and later would be appointed 
Treasury Secretary and then Chief Justice by Lincoln.138  Chase said in 
June of 1860 that, “[w]e don’t mean to interfere with slavery where it 
is, but mean to stay it there.”139  Chase was under pressure from 
Lincoln to backtrack from his earlier, more adamant anti-slavery 
position.140  Those earlier speeches by Chase, in favor of substantive 
due process, were more political and tactical than legally convincing, 
and the flaws in his reasoning were apparent even in the 1840s and 
1850s.141  Chase’s 1860 retreat from substantive due process later 
morphed back into support for it; in passing the Legal Tender Act of 
1862,142 Congress committed what Chase would describe in 1871 as a 
“manifest violation” of substantive due process.143  Yet in 1862 neither 
Chase nor a single member of the Republican-controlled Congress 
publicly pointed to any such purported violation of substantive due 
process.144 
In the years leading up to the Civil War, Republicans were much 
more united behind halting the spread of slavery than in rolling it 
back, and their due process plank reflected that policy.  Congress 
would act (in the words of the platform) “whenever such legislation is 
necessary” to prevent slavery from spreading beyond its existing 
limits.145  David Wilmot, for example, was primarily interested in 
 
 138  Chase commented about the 1856 GOP platform: “I hardly believe that the 
majority understood what broad principles they were avowing.”  Letter of Salmon P. 
Chase to George W. Julian (July 17, 1856), quoted in WILLIAM GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS 
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852–1856, at 337 (1987) (stating  that Chase may have 
exaggerated those principles). 
 139  Political, N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, June 15, 1860. 
 140  See Salmon P. Chase, The Address of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention 
Held at Cincinnati, June 11 and 12, 1845, ANTI-SLAVERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at 
75, 86 (1867) (stating that due process renders slavery “in any place of exclusive 
national jurisdiction, impossible”).  Chase’s 1845 position apparently meant slavery 
was not only unlawful in the District, but also Congress had illegally admitted slave 
states.  By 1859, Chase was under pressure to moderate his positions.  See Letter from 
Abraham Lincoln to Salmon P. Chase (June 20, 1859), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 386 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 141  See FONER, supra note 90, at 85. 
 142  Legal Tender Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 345 (1862). 
 143  See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (1 Wall.) 457, 580 (1871) (Chase, C.J., dissenting). 
 144  See Ajit v. Pai, Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR. 
L. REV. 535, 583–84, 588 (1998).  Chase helped get the measure passed as Treasury 
Secretary, and his own picture appeared on the one dollar bill.  See BARBARA ALLMAN, 
BANKING 8 (2005). 
 145  The platform language “whenever such legislation is necessary” has been 
characterized as a “loophole.”  RICHARD CURRENT, THE LINCOLN NOBODY KNOWS 102 
(1963). 
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maintaining free territories in a free condition, hoping that the 
institution might eventually wither elsewhere.146 While political 
convenience surely influenced how Republican leaders chose the 
ingredients of their due process plank, there is little evidence that 
political convenience influenced how they defined those ingredients. 
The 1860 due process plank began by saying (in the present 
tense) that, “the normal condition of all the territory of the United 
States is that of freedom.” 147 According to usual usage in 1860, the 
word “territory” did not include the entire nation, which is evident 
from the due process plank itself, because the “republican fathers” 
had not abolished slavery within the states or on other federal 
properties, like forts and dockyards.148  Given that narrow usage, it was 
widely understood in 1860 that the word “territory” in the due 
process plank did not include the District of Columbia, and therefore 
abolitionists protested omission of the District from the plank.149  Few 
slaves were known to be living in the territories as of 1860, which 
meant that freedom was in a sense the normal condition there, 
whereas slavery in the District had been common for many years.150 
Republicans chose not to use the 1860 platform to confront slavery in 
the District as a matter of legislative policy, much less as a 
constitutional issue.151  Everyone knew that Republicans were 
generally against slavery, but the party was seeking to be conciliatory 
rather than incendiary, war was not yet inevitable, and accordingly 
they chose in 1860 to emphasize halting the spread of slavery rather 
than eliminating it nationwide. 
 
 146  CONG. GLOBE 29th CONG., 2D SESS., 354 (1847).  Wilmot said, of maintaining 
slave territories in a slave condition, “I will not change its institutions, then.”  See also 
CONG. GLOBE 29th CONG., 2ND SESS., App. 315–17 (1847) (Wilmot’s remarks). 
 147  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32.  The drafters of the 1860 plank 
chose the word “normal,” then replaced it with “constitutional and legal,” and then 
restored the word “normal.”  See Manuscript Draft of the Republican National Convention 
of 1860, Kasson Papers, supra note 98.  Cf. Ewing, supra note 92, at 6 (using the word 
“normal” in a legal sense).  
 148 See FONER, supra note 9, at 203. 
 149  Lincoln distinguished territories from the District.  See, e.g., Debate at Freeport, 
supra note 113 (Lincoln committed to prohibiting “slavery in all the United States 
Territories” but not “slavery in the District of Columbia”).  Abolitionists like 
Frederick Douglass made that same linguistic distinction too, which is why they 
protested omission of the District from the due process plank.  See infra note 180.  See 
generally District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432 (1973) (“Unlike either the 
States or Territories, the District is truly sui generis.”).   
 150  See supra notes 85 and 86 (slave populations in the District and the territories, 
respectively). 
 151  See, e.g., N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, supra note 139 and accompanying text (statement 
by Chase). 
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Republicans rightly regarded slavery as barbaric and execrable, 
wherever it existed, but that by no means indicates they viewed it as 
an inherent due process violation.  On the contrary, the 1860 due 
process plank was narrowly tailored to apply only in certain areas 
where slavery did not already have legal existence, and where various 
other constitutional provisions were applicable against that hated 
institution. 
V. PLANK IMPLICATES CLAUSES OTHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS 
The Due Process Clause was recited in the plank for a reason.  
Lawyers in the mid-nineteenth century often sought to establish that 
a process was not a “due” process by showing that it violated another 
part of the Constitution.152  In essence, the Due Process Clause 
provided a remedy for violation of those other clauses upon which it 
depended.  Justice Curtis, on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, 
affirmed this kind of argument in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land.153  A 
legal treatise by William Rawle had made a similar point in 1829.154  
The basic remedy for lack of legal and constitutional authorization 
was that executive, judicial, and legislative officials could not deprive 
anyone of life, liberty, or property. 
A. Substantive Clauses 
As a remedial or dependent provision, the Due Process Clause in 
the Fifth Amendment operated synergistically with the Territories 
Clause’s substantive requirement that all rules and regulations must 
be “needful.”  People like John Bingham also viewed slavery as a 
substantive violation of the Titles of Nobilities Clause and also the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, both of which were operable 
synergistically with the Due Process Clause.155 
That kind of remedial or synergistic operation has nothing to do 
 
 152  See, e.g., New Facts and Presentation of the Case at 1, Commonwealth v. 
Twitchell (1869) (on file with the Yale Law School Rare Book Room).  This request 
for pardon (submitted to the Governor of Pennsylvania) asserted that a death 
warrant is “prohibited by any but a due process of law as in the Fifth Article of that 
great Instrument, in view of the guaranteed rights of the Sixth Article”).  Id.  See 
generally Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 321 (1869) (opinion by 
Chase, C.J.). 
 153  59 U.S. (1 How.) 272, 277 (1856). 
 154  WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 129 (1970).   
 155  See CONG. GLOBE, supra notes 117 and 118. 
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with substantive due process, because the Due Process Clause by itself 
could not do anything.156  While substantive clauses provide that some 
governmental action is unlawful, the Due Process Clause describes 
the consequence: preservation of life, liberty, and property.157 
Besides the Territories Clause, the Titles of Nobilities Clause, 
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice McLean also 
referenced implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
a reason why Congress lacked power to give legal existence to slavery 
on free soil.158  Additionally, in 1828, the Supreme Court had created 
some ambiguity about whether Congress might have further power to 
regulate the territories under Article IV aside from the power given 
by the Territories Clause.159  That plethora of substantive 
constitutional clauses and principles helps to explain why the authors 
of the due process plank did not try to explicitly pick out one or 
more of them. 
The Territories Clause says that Congress may adopt “needful” 
rules and regulations for the territories.160  That clause was enough to 
provide a basis for asserting in the due process plank that, “we deny 
the authority of [C]ongress . . . to give legal existence to slavery in any 
territory of the United States.”  The due process plank did not 
explicitly cite the Territories Clause.  However, the plank obviously 
alluded to it by pointing to the Northwest Ordinance,161 which 
Congress had reenacted in 1789 pursuant to the Territories Clause.162  
 
 156  See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (distinguishing 
“remedial, rather than substantive” law); JAMES SIMEON, CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 208 (2010) (“[T]here is a significant difference 
between substantive and remedial law.”). 
 157  See supra note 30 and accompanying text (quoting the Court in Murray’s 
Lessee). 
 158  See McLean, infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 159  See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (stating that 
Congress can regulate territories “in virtue of the general right of sovereignty, which 
exists in the government; or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make 
all needful rules. . . .”). 
 160  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“Congress shall have power to . . . make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States . . . .”).   
 161  An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, 
North-West of the River Ohio (1787) 1 Stat. 50 (1789).  This law banned territorial 
slavery, but only in the eventual states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota.  See ROGER RANSOM, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION, AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 24 
(1989). 
 162  The 1856 Republican platform included a sentence immediately after the due 
process plank, which again implicitly referred to the Territories Clause: 
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So, on its face, the due process plank was not intended to be a 
comprehensive enumeration of all relevant constitutional authority. 
David Wilmot’s anti-slavery efforts, including his Wilmot Proviso, 
had long relied upon the Territories Clause, and the due process 
plank existed in that context.163  Since the plank was amply supported 
by the Territories Clause (and perhaps other clauses) for its assertion 
about the authority of Congress, there was no necessity to cook up 
any theory of substantive due process to justify the plank, even if such 
a theory had been considered plausible. 
The broad and comprehensive language of the District Clause164 
conferred upon Congress more discretion to maintain and support 
slavery than the Territories Clause conferred.165  After all, the District 
Clause does not require that any regulations be “needful,” and that 
fact is consistent with omission of the District from the due process 
plank’s denial of congressional authority. 
According to one anti-slavery congressman speaking in 1850, 
“[s]lavery is not a needful rule or regulation.”166 John McLean, the 
1856 Republican presidential candidate and Supreme Court Justice, 
took a more nuanced position regarding the limited scope of 
congressional power under the Territories Clause: 
The power here given is limited to the regulation of the 
 
Resolved: that the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign 
powers over the Territories of the United States for their government; 
and that in the exercise of this power, it is both the right and the 
imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin 
relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery. 
PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 27 (third resolution of 1856 platform).  This 
“barbarism” plank was omitted from the 1860 platform due partly to concern that its 
blunt language might jeopardize Lincoln’s election.  BURLINGAME, supra note 103, at 
612.  Still, the 1860 platform opposed slavery, and called the African slave trade 
“execrable.” PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 33 (ninth declaration of the 1860 
platform).  
 163  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 107 (1995). 
 164  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over . . . the Seat of Government of the 
United States . . . .”). 
 165  See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 17 
(2000) (“A lawyer could credibly argue that an ‘exclusive’ power is broader than a 
power to make ‘needful’ rules. . . .”).  David Wilmot said, of the District Clause in 
1849, “[t]here could be no broader or more comprehensive grant of power. . . .” 
GOING, supra note 96, at 336. 
 166  CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS., App. 231 (1850) (Rep. Sackett).  Sackett 
became a Republican in 1856 because “its platform embraced the prominent 
principles he had always advocated, particularly the abolition of slavery.”  GEORGE 
BAKER ANDERSON, OUR COUNTY AND ITS PEOPLE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND BIOGRAPHICAL 
RECORD OF SARATOGA, NEW YORK 500 (1899). 
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property of the Government. . . . [I]mplied powers can only 
be exercised in carrying into effect a specific power. . . . 
[Congress may] provide for the administration of justice 
among the settlers, [but] it does by no means follow that 
they may establish slavery.167 
This narrow interpretation of the Territories Clause forbade federal 
establishment of slavery, but did not forbid federal maintenance of 
slavery.168  The substantive provisions upon which McLean relied did 
not include the Due Process Clause.169  McLean’s position is evidently 
embodied in the due process plank that was adopted in 1856 when 
he sought the party’s presidential nomination. 
B. Procedural Clauses 
Ohio Congressman Joshua Giddings, a primary author of the 
1856 due process plank who was later excluded from the 1860 
platform committee, had a procedural understanding of due process: 
“[T]rial before a court of competent jurisdiction, by a jury of his 
peers.”170  Indeed, the federal judiciary had long said that the 
principle of Magna Carta would be satisfied in the event of judgment 
by jury.171  Moreover, the Constitution explicitly guaranteed a jury for 
both criminal and civil trials.172 
A pro-slavery government could easily finesse the procedural 
problem identified by Giddings, for example by allowing a futile jury 
trial in which a slave could vainly attempt to prove that he was not a 
slave.173  Giddings likely saw a jury trial as an opportunity for anti-
 
 167  McLean, supra note 132, at 2.  This is the same enumerated powers argument 
that McLean later made in Dred Scott.  See supra text accompanying note 84 (quoting 
McLean). 
 168  See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 77, at 143. 
 169  McLean, supra note 132, at 2. 
 170  See GEORGE WASHINGTON JULIAN supra note 121, at 383; see also Joshua 
Giddings, Mr. Giddings to Gov. Corwin, THE LIBERATOR, Oct. 29, 1858, at 1 (noting 
“trial and conviction before some tribunal having jurisdiction of the offense”); see 
also, infra note 206 (exclusion of Giddings from 1860 platform committee).  Cf. supra, 
note 121 (Giddings generally believed that unjust laws are not laws at all). 
 171  See, e.g., Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 828 
(C.C.D.N.J. 1830).  Justice Baldwin stated that providing a jury is sufficient but not 
necessary to guard the principle of Magna Carta.  Id.  In 1855, Justice McLean also 
likened due process to a jury requirement.  See Russell v. Barney, 21 F. Cas. 38, 40 
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1855). 
 172  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (jury in criminal cases); U.S. CONST. amend. VII 
(jury in civil cases). 
 173  See Williams, supra note 21, at 475 n.3 (noting that “few . . . challenges would 
have succeeded without some substantive limits”).  See generally GILDER & FISH, infra 
note 178 (Lincoln discussing how to decide if a person is a slave).  
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slavery jurors to nullify slavery statutes, and he had already endorsed 
jury nullification of statutes designed for catching fugitive slaves in 
northern states.174  But Lincoln prevented the 1860 platform from 
calling for repeal of any fugitive slave laws,175 much less calling for jury 
nullification, and most Republicans including John McLean deplored 
jury nullification.176 
Giddings’ interpretation of “due process” can be added to the 
views of Bingham, McLean, and many others to collectively explain 
why the due process plank was vague about which  provisions of the 
Constitution were applicable.  The plank’s main message was that the 
Due Process Clause (together with fresh Supreme Court precedent) 
forbade the federal government from taking any measures to 
circumvent constitutional prohibitions against pro-slavery laws.177 
It is possible that some Republicans could have seen the plank’s 
recitation of the Due Process Clause as simply a call for procedural 
safeguards (such as a jury trial) to ensure that free African-Americans 
would not be misidentified and treated as slaves, quite apart from the 
plank’s assertion that Congress had no authority to give legal 
existence to slavery in federal territories.178  However, there appears to 
be no evidence for that interpretation, and there would have been no 
reason for the plank to discuss that flavor of due process in the 
territories but not in the District of Columbia. 
VI. ABOLITIONISTS’ CRITICISMS OF THE 1860 PLATFORM 
There is no chance that omission of the District of Columbia 
from the 1860 due process plank was accidental, or that it was 
misunderstood.  The 1860 platform only mentioned the District in a 
completely different context (i.e., corruption in the “federal 
metropolis”).179 
The plank’s omission of the District was sufficiently obvious that 
abolitionists like Frederick Douglass quickly seized upon it.180  
 
 174  See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess. 15–16 (1850) (Rep. Giddings). 
 175  Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Salmon P. Chase (June 20, 1859) in 3 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 386 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 176  See CLAY CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION 82–83 (1998). 
 177  See supra text accompanying note 30 (quoting Murray’s Lessee). 
 178  In his first inaugural address, Lincoln sought “all the safeguards of liberty 
known in civilized and humane jurisprudence” to protect non-slaves from slavery.  
GILDER & FISH, supra note 10, at 172.  In that speech he did not, however, equate 
those safeguards to “due process.”  Id. 
 179  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (sixth resolution). 
 180  Douglass protested the omission of the District from the 1856 platform.  See 
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Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison also criticized that omission from 
the 1860 platform: 
It will be seen that it takes no issue with the Dred Scott 
decision, or with the Fugitive Slave Law, or with slavery as it 
exists in the District of Columbia; and, by omission at least, 
surrenders its old nonextension of slavery policy, and this 
virtually endorses the “popular sovereignty” doctrine of 
Stephen Arnold Douglas, so far as admission of new states 
into the Union is concerned.181 
Like Douglass, Garrison was one of the country’s foremost 
abolitionists, and Garrison analyzed the Constitution as written, 
without trying to insert anti-slavery meanings that did not originally 
exist.182  Garrison’s colleague, Wendell Phillips, explained that, “[t]he 
Constitution will never be amended by persuading men that it does 
not need amendment.”183  Garrison’s analysis of the 1860 platform 
was equally realistic, and there were also realistic reasons for the 
other omissions that Garrison identified in the 1860 platform. 
By saying that neither Congress, nor a territorial legislature, nor 
any individuals could give legal existence to slavery, the 1860 
platform conspicuously left the United States Supreme Court off that 
list.184  Garrison was correct that the 1860 platform did not explicitly 
mention the Supreme Court or Dred Scott by name, but the platform 
did at least imply that the Dred Scott doctrine was “a dangerous 
political heresy.”185  That was more diplomatic than a frontal attack on 
the Court. 
As for omission of the District from the due process plank, there 
was no consensus among Republicans in the 1850s that slavery there 
was unconstitutional.186  The faction that agreed with John Bingham 
that it was unconstitutional failed to put a noticeable dent in the 
platform.  And as a policy matter, Republicans wished to emphasize 
 
FONER, supra note 90, at 80.  See also FONER, supra note 8 (Douglass registered the same 
objection about the 1860 platform).  
 181  See Lockwood, supra note 8.  See also BURLINGAME, supra note 103, at 612.  
 182  See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF 
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 13 (2001). 
 183  PHILLIPS, supra note 45, at 4.  See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: 
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 154–57 (1984) (quoting Garrison’s statement 
that, “[t]he important thing is not the words of the bargain, but the bargain itself”). 
 184  PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (eighth resolution).  The word 
“individuals” in the due process plank could include judges.  See generally The Courts at 
Bar, 8 GREEN BAG 381 (1896).   
 185  PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (seventh resolution). 
 186  See, e.g., STRINER, supra note 101, at 79 (Lincoln’s view). 
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containment of slavery rather than abolition. 
Likewise, Garrison’s criticism about the 1860 platform’s 
omission of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 did not arise from drafting 
error.187  Lincoln had made clear in 1859 that he objected to 
including a plank in the 1860 platform calling for repeal of the 
Fugitive Slave Act, predicting that a plank like that would “explode 
the convention and the party.”188  Later, in his first inaugural address, 
Lincoln urged implementation of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave 
Clause, even though he abhorred it.189  Mentioning fugitive slaves in 
the 1860 plank was considered and rejected. 
Another of Garrison’s objections (quoted above) was to the 
platform’s silence about popular sovereignty.  In 1860, the term 
“popular sovereignty” meant leaving the matter of slavery entirely to 
local control within the federal territories.190  Some historians have 
contended that the 1860 due process plank was basically urging 
congressional elimination of territorial slavery, contingent upon local 
authorities failing to eliminate it themselves.191  In that way, Garrison’s 
goal would be achieved with a minimum of fuss at the federal level.  
Indeed, Republicans in Congress did not feel obliged by the 1860 
platform to ban territorial slavery.192  The 1860 platform did mention 
popular sovereignty, explicitly accusing Congress of committing 
“deception and fraud” by reneging on an implied promise to leave 
the matter entirely under local control.193   
Whatever the moral dimensions of letting citizens of the District 
decide about emancipation themselves, that was the course 
 
 187  Act of Sept. 18, 1850 (“Fugitive Slave Act”), ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). 
 188  3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 175, at 386. 
 189  GILDER & FISH, supra note 10, at 169. 
 190  See generally JUNIUS P. RODRIGUEZ, SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (2007). 
 191  See, e.g., DON FEHRENBACHER, LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT 56 (1987). 
 192  See JETER ISELEY,  HORACE GREELEY AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 289 (1947).  The 
platform committee rejected “the requirement that Congress shall positively prohibit 
Slavery in every territory whether there be or be not a possibility of its going thither.”  
Accordingly, during the waning days of the Buchanan administration, Republicans in 
Congress passed bills to organize new territories without banning slavery in them, 
because they deemed slavery there unlikely.  Id.  
 193  From the 1860 platform: 
That in the recent vetoes by the federal governors of the acts of the 
Legislatures of Kansas and Nebraska, prohibiting slavery in those 
territories, we find a practical illustration of the boasted democratic 
principle of non-intervention and popular sovereignty, embodied in 
the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and a demonstration of the deception and 
fraud involved therein. 
PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1 (tenth declaration of platform). 
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recommended by Abraham Lincoln during debate with Stephen 
Douglas in 1858.194  Lincoln’s recommendation was not consistent 
with any alleged consensus among Republicans that federal 
protection for slavery violated “substantive due process.” 
VII. HORTATORY RATHER THAN MANDATORY LANGUAGE IN THE 
PLATFORM 
Shortly after the 1856 plank was adopted, radical Republican 
George Julian (a once and future Indiana congressman whose father-
in-law was Congressman Joshua Giddings), claimed that some 
hortatory language in the 1856 due process plank—about the 
“ulterior design” of the Constitution—signified that slavery in the 
District of Columbia was unconstitutional.195  However, that 1856 
language was removed from the 1860 due process plank.196  All the 
same, Republicans agreed with Julian that the Constitution, including 
the Bill of Rights, applied to the District.197 
But there was still some hortatory language left in the 1860 due 
process plank, which used the word “should” instead of “shall,” saying 
that no person “should” be deprived.198  Although the difference 
between “shall” and “should” may seem slight, modern scholars credit 
the First Congress with “changing the flaccid verb ‘ought’ to ‘shall’” 
in the Bill of Rights.199  It is tempting to criticize the 1860 platform 
committee for not repeating the word “shall” that appears in the Fifth 
Amendment.  Certainly they were not entitled to misuse quotation 
marks, but they were entitled to employ the word “should” to indicate 
a hortatory rather than mandatory meaning, thereby dispelling any 
whiff of substantive due process. 
 
 194  STRINER, supra note 101, at 80. 
 195  See  FONER, supra note 9, at 80.  Julian said this in a speech on July 4, 1857 in 
Kaysville, Indiana.  See GEORGE W. JULIAN, SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, 1850–
1868, at 146 (1872).  He also equated due process with “trial by jury.”  Id. at 72, 159.  
Julian believed that enforcement of the Due Process Clause “would annihilate our 
Fugitive Slave Act,” apparently via jury nullification.  Id. at 145.  The 1856 plank, 
containing the “ulterior design” language, can be seen in the text accompanying 
supra note 65. 
 196  The removal of language in the 1860 due process plank created a storm at the 
1860 convention (Giddings was against removal), and that language was partially 
restored elsewhere in the platform.  See Kasson Papers, supra note 98.  See also 
BURLINGAME, supra note 103, at 612 (noting that Giddings stormed out). 
 197  See CURRIE, supra note 7. 
 198  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (eighth resolution). 
 199  LEONARD LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, 
AND HISTORY 272 (1995).   
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A draft of the 1856 platform used the word “shall,”200 but that 
word was subsequently changed to “should” in that same 1856 
platform, either by error or design.201  Perhaps the word “should” was 
used in 1856 in recognition that the clause did not compel Congress 
to stop slavery that was being conducted privately without any 
governmental role or action.  After the 1856 convention, platform 
committee member Joshua Giddings gave conflicting indications 
about that word of the platform,202 but by 1860 no one questioned or 
objected to use of the word “should.” 
In 1857, Justice Curtis wrote in his Dred Scott dissent that the 
issue of needfulness under the Territories Clause was discretionary 
rather than mandatory (“it is necessarily left to the legislative 
discretion to determine whether a law be needful”).  That is an 
additional reason why the 1860 convention would have retained 
(from 1856) the hortatory rather than mandatory language in the 
due process plank. 
While Congress should do whatever the Constitution says it shall 
do, merely saying that Congress should do something is only an 
exhortation, “which Congress could heed if it felt like doing so, or 
trample underfoot without the least probability of being restrained by 
the judges.”203  The 1860 convention was evidently unwilling to 
associate the word “shall” with an application of “due process” that 
might potentially have been misconstrued (e.g., substantively).204 
From start to finish, the word “should” was used instead of 
“shall” while drafting the 1860 platform, without any apparent 
objections from anyone.205  The use of “should” instead of “shall” was 
 
 200  The draft 1856 platform has been preserved.  See Platform Adopted by the 
Republican Party in convention at Philadelphia, June 17–19, 1856 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with U.S. Miscellaneous Subjects, Manuscripts and Archives 
Division, New York Public Library).  Like the final version of the 1856 platform, this 
draft did not use any internal quotation marks. 
 201  Republican National Convention, supra note 65; THE TRIBUNE ALMANAC AND 
POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1857, at 42 (Horace Greeley ed., 1857); THE TRIBUNE 
ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1858, at 33 (Horace Greeley ed., 1858). 
 202  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 34TH CONG., 3D SESS., 79 (Dec. 10, 1856) (Giddings uses 
“shall”); GIDDINGS, HISTORY OF THE REBELLION, supra note 66, at 397 (Giddings uses 
“shall”); CONG. GLOBE, 35TH CONG., 2D SESS., 345 (Jan. 12, 1859) (Giddings uses 
“shall”).  Cf. The Republican Platform, supra note 52 (Giddings uses “should”). 
 203  IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 37–38 (1965). 
 204  See, e.g., Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The word 
‘should,’ unlike the words ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must,’ is permissive rather than 
mandatory.”). 
 205  The draft 1860 platform has been preserved.  See Kasson Papers, supra note 98.  
John Kasson was the lead author.  See SMITH, supra note 88, at 18. 
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certainly not an inadvertent error in 1860.  Joshua Giddings was one 
of the authors of the 1856 platform, which also used the word 
“should,” and Giddings was an influential delegate at the 1860 
convention as well, if not a member of the 1860 platform 
committee.206  Like David Wilmot, Giddings was a lawyer.  He knew 
what the Fifth Amendment said, and he always quoted it accurately.207  
Of course, even if the platform had said “shall” instead of “should,” 
still the plank referred to due process in a way that did not challenge 
government-supported slavery in the District of Columbia, either 
rhetorically, substantively, or otherwise. 
Here is a marked-up version of the 1860 plank, to summarize 
some of the intricacies described above, including the should/shall 
distinction: 
That the normal condition of all the territory of the United 
States is that of freedom [this refers in present tense to territory 
in 1860 that had not yet reached statehood]; That as our 
Republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all 
our national territory [this refers to the Northwest Ordinance re-
enacted by Congress August 7, 1789 pursuant to the Territories 
Clause which the plank did not explicitly mention], ordained that 
“[this misplaced quote mark belongs later in the sentence] no 
person should [repeating hortatory word from the 1856 platform 
instead of the mandatory word in the Fifth Amendment] be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law,” [the Fifth Amendment was proposed September 25, 1789 at 
which time slavery had been abolished in the Northwest Territory, 
but not abolished on other federal property, or in the area that 
would become the District of Columbia] it becomes our duty, by 
legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary [this 
phrase gave Congress flexibility], to maintain this provision of 
the Constitution against all attempts to violate it [the Supreme 
Court said in 1856 that the Due Process Clause is violated 
whenever anyone is deprived of liberty in conflict with another 
clause of the Constitution]; and we deny the authority [either 
moral or legal] of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of 
any individuals [the 1856 platform had additionally listed any 
“association of individuals” which would have clearly included 
tribes], to give legal existence to slavery [this excludes areas like 
the District of Columbia where slavery already had legal existence] 
 
 206  Giddings failed to get onto the 1860 platform committee.  GIDDINGS, HISTORY 
OF THE REBELLION, supra note 66, at 444–45.  
 207  See, e.g., Giddings, supra note 170; CONG. GLOBE, supra note 202 (Jan. 12, 
1859).  
HYMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  2:54 PM 
2013] THE DUE PROCESS PLANK 269 
 
in any Territory [this redundantly excludes the District of 
Columbia] of the United States.208 
This plank was the result of intensive editing by many Republicans 
over the course of four years, from 1856 to 1860. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the barbaric and execrable institution of slavery was 
banned nationwide in 1865 by the Thirteenth Amendment, although 
Congress did not fully implement the ban until 1951.209  The 
historical record of the political battle against slavery illuminates the 
meaning of all three of the Civil War amendments.210  Of particular 
interest here, the Republican Party’s 1860 platform addressed slavery 
in a way that illuminates how they understood the concept of due 
process. 
The 1860 due process plank did not endorse substantive due 
process, even though Republicans of that era knew well that slavery 
was not compatible with liberty.  Most Republicans thought 
government-supported slavery in the District of Columbia was 
 
 208  See PORTER & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 32 (eighth resolution). 
 209  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  Congress finally criminalized all forms of slavery in 
1951.  See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME 381 (2008). 
 210  The Civil War amendments include the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Recently, that clause was the basis for the deciding vote to 
apply gun rights vis-a-vis the states.  See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 3025, 3059 
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (disclosure: 
I wrote an amicus brief).  See generally supra note 120 (meaning of “privileges and 
immunities” in Art. IV).  In contrast to the right at issue in McDonald, a right cannot 
plausibly be among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States if it is 
located nowhere else in the Constitution.  See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 449 (“The powers 
of the [federal] Government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are 
regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself.”); id. at 580 (Curtis, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he privileges and immunities of general citizenship, derived from 
and guaranteed by the Constitution, are to be enjoyed by….citizens of the United 
States.”).  The Court’s first major opinion about the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
took no notice of that consensus in Dred Scott.  See In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. 36 (1872).  The right at issue in Slaughter-House (to engage in a trade or 
profession) was nowhere else in the Constitution, and so the Court correctly 
declined to enforce that right.  But the Slaughter-House Court went much farther, 
eviscerating the clause with help from two bogeymen: (1) that Congress might 
“control” states by legislating rights that owe “their existence” not to the Constitution 
but merely to federal statutes; and (2) that the Court itself might enforce rights 
against the states merely because such non-constitutional rights “existed at the time 
of the adoption of this amendment.”  See id. at 78–79.  Correcting Slaughter-House has 
precedent, and perhaps that precedent can inspire adherence.  See United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 678 (1898) (correcting Slaughter-House Court’s 
interpretation of “jurisdiction”). 
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constitutional, though awful and subject to abolition by Congress, 
and even those who thought it was unconstitutional usually relied on 
more than just the Due Process Clause standing alone. 
The 1860 due process plank made a strong statement about the 
rightful authority of Congress, and about the evils of slavery, but it 
did not employ substantive due process, did not endorse it, did not 
attribute it to the Constitution, and did not sympathize with it.  Six 
long years later, the Fourteenth Amendment used similar language.  
The most obvious purpose of the clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to copy the original non-substantive meaning in the 
Fifth Amendment, rather than to silently import a relatively new and 
analytically different concept that was foreign to the 1860 platform. 
The Republicans’ 1860 due process plank reflected common 
ground among the various differing opinions at the national 
convention, at which virtually no one favored applying due process in 
a substantive way.  Consistent with that plank, Abraham Lincoln—
along with many others—denied that the Fifth Amendment in and of 
itself barred federal maintenance of slavery within exclusively federal 
jurisdictions like the District of Columbia. 
The plank’s use of due process was essentially remedial or 
dependent, rather than substantive.  That is, if another provision of 
the Constitution were violated by some statute or other governmental 
action, then the remedy for that violation would include preservation 
of life, liberty, and property.  Using this non-substantive principle, the 
1860 convention was able to invoke the nation’s fundamental charter 
without having to list all of the relevant substantive constitutional 
provisions, which were numerous, complex, and disputed. 
The due process plank is consistent with the recent conclusion 
of Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell: 
Due process was not at all about judicial creation of 
fundamental rights outside the reach of legislative 
amendment. . . . Fundamentally, it was about securing the 
rule of law.  It ensured that the executive would not be able 
unilaterally to deprive persons within the nation of their 
rights of life, liberty, or property except as provided by 
common law or statute. . . . 211 
 
 211  Nathan Chapman & Michael McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 
YALE L.J. 1672, 1807  (2012).  I do not entirely agree with all of the conclusions 
reached by Chapman and McConnell.  For example, Chapman and McConnell write 
that due process requires legislatures to enact deprivations only by “general rules for 
governance of future behavior.”  Id.  But people like Alexander Hamilton did not 
believe that the principle of due process forbade ex post facto criminal laws, and he 
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The antebellum history of due process is an important part of the 
larger Fourteenth Amendment puzzle, and the due process plank 
confirms how to put some of the pieces of that puzzle together.  If 
this plank is any indication, the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
embody substantive due process any more than the Fifth Amendment 
did. 
 
 
supported an explicit prohibition of ex post facto laws as a security for liberty.  See 
Williams, supra note 21, at 443.  The authors of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
(including Patrick Henry and George Mason) had a similar understanding of due 
process.  They deleted a clause barring ex post facto deprivations, because they felt 
retrospective criminal punishments were sometimes useful, while at the same time 
the Virginia Declaration of Rights included the “law of the land” clause from Magna 
Carta.  See JEFF BROADWATER, GEORGE MASON: FORGOTTEN FOUNDER 85 (2006).  There 
are nontrivial arguments against the position of Hamilton, Henry, and Mason 
regarding due process, but the weight of evidence indicates their position was 
prevalent during that era.  In England prior to American independence, ex post facto 
laws “were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land.”  Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884). 
